Abstract
Introduction
With the development of network technology, the Internet becomes a very important information source sharing by lots of users. However, as an infrastructure of the Internet, the inter-domain routing system is vulnerable to a variety of malicious attacks. BGP prefix hijacking is one sort of them. There were many prefix hijacking incidents occurred in the Internet, caused a large scale of damage in data reachability. In a hijacking attack, the attacker try to convince ASes to become infectors for redirecting data traffic to him in stead of the victim. The more infectors there are, the larger impact an attack has.
Previous efforts on BGP prefix hijacking can be sorted into three categories: preventions before the attack [1, 2] , detections during the attack [3, 4] and reactions after the attack [5] . However, the impact evaluation of prefix hijacking is orthogonal to all the existing researches in the area. This topic is considered to be a valuable new start [6, 7] .
Because the impact of BGP prefix hijacking has a tight relationship with BGP routing, we start with studying the property of BGP routing system. In this paper, we propose a method based on the fraction of amount of AS paths to evaluate the Transmit factor of every AS in the Internet. By evaluating Transmit factors of ASes wrt. the whole network and Transmit factors of ASes wrt. the specified destination, we realize that BGP routing system has a property of Hinge-Transmit. It indicates that Tier-1 AS set is the hinge of the Internet, transmitting a large fraction of data traffic to the whole network; a subset of Tier-1 AS set with a special topological location is the hinge of data delivery paths to a specified destination, transmitting a large fraction of data traffic from any source to the destination. If these critical ones receive the hijacking route and become infectors in a prefix hijacking incident, the impact of this attack will be enlarged significantly. It is much more crucial and effective to protect these hinge ASes from BGP prefix hijacking attacks. The evaluate results and conclusions in this paper have been verified by the BGP routing tables in Route Views project.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews backgrounds on BGP routing and prefix hijacking. Section 3 presents a study of Hinge-Transmit property of BGP routing system.
Background
In this section, we briefly review the process of inter-domain routing and prefix hijacking. It's much more complicated than other routing protocols because of the BGP routing policies that must be considered.
BGP Routing Policy
BGP enforces the routing policy of the Autonomous System, which corresponds to the business relationships with its neighboring ASes. There are three major types of business relationships between distinct ASes: provider to customer, customer to provider and peer to peer. The route selecting process depends on the export polices of upstream AS and the import polices of downstream AS.
According to the export polices, an AS usually does not transmit traffic between any of its providers or peers. When exchanging routing information with a provider or a peer, an AS does not export any routes of its providers and peers [8] . As shown in Fig. 1 (a) , AS4 does not export routes of provider AS1 and peer AS2 to provider AS5 and peer AS6, but can export routes of any of its neighbors to customer AS7. According to the import polices, an AS applies a priority to every route learned from its neighbors. If a BGP router receives routes to a same destination from different neighbors, it prefers route from customer over those from peer and provider; then it prefers route from peer over that from provider [8] . As shown in Fig. 1 (b) , AS5 receives routes to destination AS1 from provider AS2, peer AS3 and customer AS4. It chooses the route from customer AS4 as its best data delivery path. 
BGP Prefix Hijacking
Because of the lack of security mechanism, every BGP router has to believe the announcements they have received from other ones, no matter whether the message is creditable. As a result, the interdomain routing system is vulnerable to misconfiguration and malicious attacks. Prefix hijack attack is a kind of serious security threat.
Before the attack, an AS announces its IP prefix to the Internet. The other ones who have learned this origin route can send data traffic to the origin AS in the future. As shown in Fig.2(a) , AS1 announces 10.0.0.0/8 to its neighbors. With the propagation of this routing information, AS2, AS3 and AS4 get the route to the destination network (with IP prefix 10.0.0.0/8). During the prefix hijacking attack, the attacker announces IP prefix which belongs to the victim network. Such false hijacking route propagates on the Internet, too. The ones who choose to believe it become infectors. Data traffic from those polluted ASes will be sent to the attacker instead of the victim. Fig 2(b) illustrates this scenario. Attacker AS4 wrongly announces victim AS1's prefix. AS3 is infected as a result of Evaluation of Prefix Hijacking Impact Based on Hinge-Transmit Property of BGP Routing System Liu Yujing, Zhang Bofeng, Wang Fei, Su Jinshu accepting the hijacking route as its best choice. Consequently, the data traffic from AS3 to AS1 will be redirected to AS4. 
Study of Hinge-Transmit Property
In this section, we define a measurement of AS denoting how crucial it is for transmitting data traffic, and find the Hinge-Transmit property of BGP routing system from our evaluation results. This property is verified by routing tables recorded by Route Views project.
Transmit Factor Definition
In BGP routing table, the route from source AS to destination AS is recorded as the AS path attribute in every entry as shown in Table 1 . This example indicates that the data traffic from local network to the network with IP prefix 3.0.0.0/8 will be transmitted through AS100, AS200, AS300, and then reaches the destination AS400. AS100, AS200 and AS300 are the transit ASes which transmit traffic for local network in this instance. The more times a transit AS appears in the AS paths, the more traffic it is responsible for transmitting, the more critical it is in the inter-domain routing system. According to this evidence, we define the Transmit factor of an AS wrt. a destination AS: the fraction of AS paths from any source to the destination which contain this AS as a transit AS. It's used to describe how much traffic this AS transmits to the destination. Likewise, we define the Transmit factor of an AS wrt. whole network: the fraction of AS paths from any source to any destination which contain this AS as a transit AS. It's used to describe how much traffic this AS transmits to the whole network. Formally, in an AS set N consists of all ASes in the whole network, AP s,d represents the AS set consists of all the ASes contained in the AS path from source AS s to destination AS d.
Otherwise, it equals to 0. The Transmit factor of i wrt. destination d is defined as (1); the Transmit factor of i wrt. whole network is defined as (2).
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Furthermore, we define the Transmit factor of an AS set wrt. a destination AS: the fraction of AS paths from any source to the destination which contain at least one AS in this set as a transit AS. It's used to describe how much traffic this AS set transmits to the destination. Likewise, we define the Transmit factor of an AS set wrt. whole network: the fraction of AS paths from any source to any destination which contain at least one AS in this set as a transit AS. It's used to describe how much traffic this AS set transmits to the whole network. Formally, I represents an AS set. E s,d (I) equals to 1 if  i ∈I, i ∈AP s,d -{d}. Otherwise, it equals to 0. The Transmit factor of AS set I wrt. destination d is defined as (3) . The Transmit factor of AS set I wrt. whole network is defined as (4).
Transmit Factor Evaluation
In order to evaluate the Transmit factor of every AS accurately, it is essential to collect all the AS paths from any source to any destination. As mentioned in above paragraphs, BGP is a policy-based routing protocol. Based on the basic limits of routing polices, it is possible to infer all the AS paths by simulating the BGP routing process if AS topology with relationship information of the Internet is offered. In this section, the AS Relationships data in CAIDA [9] [10] [11] is used to infer the AS paths.
Transmit Factor Evaluation wrt. Whole Network
We use the inferred AS paths as an input and calculate the Transmit factor of every AS in the Internet defined in (2) . The result is shown as Fig. 3 . From this figure, we find that there are only a few ASes having very high Transmit factor, but most ASes having very low Transmit factor. This means in BGP routing system, a few ASes are responsible for transmitting a large fraction of data traffic to the whole network, but most ASes transmit few. Those ASes with high Transmit factor belong to the Tier-1 AS set [12] . These 13 Tier-1 ASes are in the top routing hierarchy of the Internet. They peer with each other and have no providers. We consider those ASes as one set called Tier1S, and evaluate the Transmit factor of this set defined in (4). The result of T(Tier1S) is as high as 0.827, which means there are 82.7% of the total AS paths from any source to any destination passing through at least one Tier-1 AS. From this result, we realize that in BGP routing system, the Tier-1 AS set is the hinge of the Internet data delivery, transmitting a large fraction of data traffic to the whole network.
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Transmit Factor Evaluation wrt. Destination
The evaluation result of Transmit factor of AS wrt. destination defined as (1) shows that even in the Tier-1 AS set, not all the ASes are equivalent. The Transmit factor differs sharply by different destinations. An example of our evaluation results is presented in Fig. 4 . The Transmit factor of Tier-1 AS2914 wrt. destination AS32148 is high, which means a large fraction of traffic from any source to AS32148 is transmitted by AS2914; and the Transmit factor of Tier-1 AS3561 and AS209 wrt. destination AS25650 are high, which means a large fraction of traffic from any source to AS25650 is transmitted by AS3561 and AS209. By analyzing the topology of these ASes, we find these Tier-1 ASes with high Transmit factor are in special topological locations wrt. the destinations. As shown in Fig. 5 , AS2914 is the Tier-1 AS which has the least provider -customer hops to the destination AS32148; while AS3561 and AS209 are the Tier-1 ASes which have the least provider -customer hops to the destination AS25650. We call the Tier-1 AS in this special topological location the core AS of the destination. In BGP routing system, almost every destination AS has a core AS set core d which consists of the nearest Tier-1 providers of the destination. To validate all the ASes' core AS sets have high Transmit factors wrt. destinations, we evaluate all of them defined in (3) and calculate the mean value defined as (5).
The result of ) ( d core T is 0.652, which means there are 65.2% of the total AS paths from any source to a destination passing through at least one of its core AS. This result shows that every AS' core AS set transmits a large fraction of data traffic from any source to the AS, acting as the hinge of the data delivery paths to the destination.
Hinge-Transmit Property of BGP Routing System
This phenomenon is caused by the routing policy of BGP. As mentioned before, a BGP router prefers route from customer over others when having several alternate routes to reach a particular destination. So the routing information propagates along the least customer -provider hops from the destination to Tier-1 ASes, and then propagates along peer -peer or provider -customer hops after that. This causes many BGP routing paths to pass through the core ASes, which means there is a large fraction of data traffic transmitted by a small amount of ASes. We call this property of BGP routing system Hinge-Transmit. To be more convincible, we validate this property by BGP routing tables collected by Route Views [13, 14] .
We choose routing tables in 10 different times randomly. By calculating the fraction of AS paths which contain Tier-1 ASes, we get the result shown in Fig. 6 . The result shows that in all 10 cases, more than 80% of the AS paths pass through at least one Tier-1 AS. The Tier-1 AS set not only has a high connecting degree but also has a high delivery degree. Further more, we calculate the fraction of AS paths which contain core ASes with the help of the topology information offered by CAIDA AS Relationships project, and get the result shown in Fig. 7 . It shows that more than 75% of the AS paths from any source to a destination pass through at least one core AS of the destination in all 10 cases. The core AS set plays a critical role in transmitting data traffic to the destination in BGP routing system. 
Evaluation of Prefix Hijacking Impact
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In a prefix hijacking incident, attacker announces the IP prefix which belongs to victim network maliciously. This hijacking route propagates in the inter-domain routing system, too. The one who accepts it becomes an infector. Infectors redirect the data traffic aimed at victim to attacker. The more infectors exist, the more impact the hijacking attack has. Some infectors not only send their own traffic but also transmit others' traffic carried by them to the attacker. These infectors enlarge the impact of the hijacking. Through study of Hinge-Transmit property of BGP routing system we figure out which ASes they are and where they are located. In this section, we first define the quantitative measurement of BGP prefix hijacking impact; then evaluate the impact based on Hinge-Transmit property of BGP routing system; finally, validate the results by real prefix hijack incidents occurred in the Internet.
Prefix Hijacking Impact definition
When the attacker a wrongly announces victim v's IP prefix, whether an AS i becomes infected depends on which route it selects to send traffic, the origin route r i,v or the hijacking route r i,a . It follows the same process with normal routing decision without checking the origin AS whom the route is announced from. But we can figure the infected status by detecting which route AS i has chosen, like (6) . If AS i chooses the hijacking route as the path that it send traffic through, AS i is infected, and its status function Infect(a,i,v) is equal to 1; if AS i chooses the origin route, its status function is equal to 0 which means it's not infected.
In BGP routing table, if an AS becomes an infector, the origin AS of its AS path changes from victim to attacker, which is called a Multiple-Origin-AS conflict. For example, if AS500 announces the IP prefix 3.0.0.0/8 of AS400 maliciously, the infector's routing table changes from what is shown in Table 1 to that in Table 2 . According to this, we calculate the number of infectors in a prefix hijacking incidents. 
Impact(a,v) is an appropriate measurement to describe the damage impact of an attack. The more infected ASes there are, the more data traffic will be wrongly redirected, the more impact a prefix hijacking incident will have.
Prefix Hijacking Impact Evaluation Method
A Prefix hijacking incident consists of an attacker, a victim and several infectors. This incident can be further divided into several scenes. Each of them contains one infector. A prefix hijacking scenario is shown in Fig. 8 . This incident has 2 scenes which are Scene 1 consists of attacker, victim and infector 1; and Scene 2 consists of attacker, victim and infector 2. Impact of a prefix hijacking scene is presented like (8) . From this function we can see that the impact is related to the Transmit factor of infector wrt. victim. The status function Infect(a,i,v) is represented as engender factor of impact, while the Transmit factor T v (i) is enlarge factor. As shown in (9), the impact of an incident is larger or equal to the maximum impact of all the detected infected scenes. For simplicity, we consider this maximum value as the approximation of the evaluation result. It's obvious that the impact of Incident 2 and 5 is much larger than others. In Incident 2, AS27506 wrongly announced the IP prefix 204.13.72.0/24 which belongs to AS33584 into the global routing system. Two of AS33584's core ASes which are AS701 and AS2914 chose to believe the hijacking route announced by attacker AS27506. This hijacking route propagated wildly in the whole network after that, launching an attack with impact as high as 0.563. In Incident 5, the IP prefix 65.164.53.0/24 which belongs to AS19198 was hijacked by AS9121. The core AS of victim was infected in this incident, which caused another impactive prefix hijacking attack. The other incidents in our experiment didn't cause the core ASes to be infected, so the damage in data reachability of these attacks is less than the previous two.
Conclusion
In this paper, we study BGP routing process under the control of routing polices. By evaluating a series of Transmit factors of AS which reflects the fraction of data traffic transmitted by the AS, we realize that BGP routing system has a Hinge-Transmit property. Based on this property, we evaluate the impact of BGP prefix hijacking attack, and find the root of matter why the impact differs a lot in different incidents. All of our findings and results are verified by the statistic data of BGP routing tables collected by Route Views project.
It is very important to realize the Hinge-Transmit property of BGP routing system. The few hinge ASes which transmit a large fraction of traffic are the keys of inter-domain routing system security. If these ASes are infected in BGP prefix hijacking, a lot of data traffic aimed at the victim network will be redirected to the attacker. To improve the security of inter-domain routing system, it is crucial and effective to protect these hinge ASes from misconfiguration and malicious attacks.
